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“The difference between utility and utility plus beauty is
the difference between telephone wires and the spider web.”
- Edwin Way Teale, September 18, CIRCLE OF THE SEASONS (1953)

INTRODUCTION

Patents: Legal Challenges to Intellectual Property Rights and the Impact on Basic
Research and Development, 39 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 815 (2012).
4. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012) [hereinafter Mayo].
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1. In this article, “biotechnology” is used when serving as a noun, and “biotech”
when serving as an adjective.
2. Biotechnology uses biological building blocks (such as amino acids, proteins,
DNA and RNA) to engineer useful biomedical processes and products. See generally
Lorance L. Greenlee, Biotechnology Patent Law: Perspective of the First Seventeen
Years, Prospective on the Next Seventeen Years, 68 DENV. U. L. REV. 127 (1991).
3. See generally Thomas A. Hemphill, The Biotechnology Sector and U.S. Gene
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This year, the modern biotech 1 industry turns 40. 2 Born with the
advent of recombinant DNA technology, today’s biotech industry has
flourished as an important area of clinical practice, research and
development. Biotechnology has become especially important in the
realm of diagnostics.
Through the extraction, isolation,
manipulation, comparison and analysis of biological compounds,
biotechnology offers medicine a highly reliable way of assessing
individual risk factors and treatment options for a vast array of
conditions. At the same time, the relationship of biotech patents to
naturally occurring human biology has rendered biotech patents
vulnerable to validity challenges, leading to significant uncertainty for
an industry that relies heavily on large investments in research and
Last year, the patent eligibility of diagnostic
development. 3
biotechnology was narrowed via the natural phenomenon doctrine in
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.; 4 a
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decision considered confusing by some and dangerously overreaching by others. 5 For over a century, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the natural phenomenon doctrine to be an implied
exception to subject-matter eligibility under § 101, which defines the
categories of innovations that may be eligible for patent protection. 6
The natural phenomenon doctrine excludes laws of nature, products
of nature and abstract ideas from patent-eligible subject matter. 7
This term, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.—concerning the
patent-eligibility of genes associated with breast and ovarian cancer
risk 8—which the Court had previously remanded to the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Mayo. 9 At
issue in both Myriad and Mayo was the validity of certain
biotechnology patent claims that closely resembled abstract
principles, laws of nature, or natural phenomena. After the Federal
Circuit held that Mayo, a case about process patents, did not provide
the controlling law for the gene patents at issue in Myriad, the
Supreme Court granted cert on the question of whether genes are
patentable subject matter. 10 In a unanimous decision, the Court
found that isolated genomic DNA (gDNA) constitutes patentineligible natural phenomena, whereas complementary DNA
(cDNA) 11 is patent-eligible because it is different from naturally
occurring DNA. The Court, however, did not provide any guidance
on the implications of the invalidated claims on isolated gDNA for
claims on processes involving isolated gDNA. The extent to which §

C M
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30 NATURE BIOTECH. 758 (2012).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
7. “Natural phenomenon doctrine” is used in this paper to refer to the triad of
patentable subject matter exceptions (products of nature, laws of nature and abstract
ideas).
8. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
[hereinafter Myriad].
9. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794
(2012).
10. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v USPTO, rev’d sub nom Myriad, 689 F. 3d
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No.
11-725), rev’d in part, granted in part, remanded, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
11. An essential tool of the biotech industry, cDNA (shorthand for
complementary DNA) is a replica of real DNA with none of the introns but all of the
exons that are normally found in naturally occurring DNA. The absence of introns,
which can be thought of as structural noise, allows scientists to efficiently analyze
only the relevant parts of the DNA.
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5. See generally JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42815, MAYO V.
PROMETHEUS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENTS, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND PERSONALIZED
MEDICINE (2012); see also Elizabeth J. Haanes & Jaume M. Cànaves, Stealing Fire: A
Retrospective Survey of Biotech Patent Claims in the Wake of Mayo v. Prometheus,
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12. Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561,
568 (2006).

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 23 Side B

101 jurisprudence regarding biotech patent claims on processes
extends to biotech patent claims on compositions of matter —which,
as cells and compounds, are themselves “essentially bags of chemical
processes” 12—is usefully informed by an analysis of the unique
trajectories that process patent law has followed in the Federal Circuit
and Supreme Court. To this end, it is relevant to understand how
statutory and judicial patentability categories for processes have
developed over time, how flexible their contours have been, as well as
when and to what extent they may be subjected to a doctrine of
ambiguous scope and relevance.
Part I of this paper will introduce early legal developments
concerning biomedical process patents in order to examine the
rationales for distinct doctrinal approaches to three different kinds of
biomedical processes. This section will explain how, characterized by
varying degrees of overlap with compositions of matter, certain kinds
of biomedical processes, including biotech processes, were excluded
from early attempts to address concerns about monopolies on
medical knowledge. After describing the entangled nature of process
and product patents in biotechnology, Part II turns to an analysis of
the evolution of judicial and statutory standards that reflected this
entanglement of biotech patent claims. Part III follows with a review
of how the Federal Circuit attempted to address some of these issues
by creating and altering analytical frameworks tailored to new kinds
of biomedical processes. In contrast, this section then traces the
Supreme Court’s stronger reliance on patent eligibility limitations to
assess the rationale of the natural phenomenon doctrine for
addressing the intertwined nature of biotech process and product
patents. Part IV then considers the relevance of the natural
phenomenon doctrine in assessing the implications of Mayo and
Myriad for biotech process patents, arguing that subject-matter
eligibility of claims on genes and other diagnostic biotechnology
should properly account for overlapping scopes of preemption
between associated process and composition of matter claims in this
realm. This paper concludes that due to the natural phenomenon
doctrine’s implicit purpose—that the preemptive scope of a
diagnostic biotech patent be limited to the inventive use of that
product—the doctrine is of limited usefulness at the litigation stage;
however, the rationale underlying the doctrine, and the importance
of the doctrine in limiting monopolies on scientific knowledge, may
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still be pursued through other legal means.
I. BIOMEDICAL PROCESS PATENTS AND THE SPECIAL CASE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY

A. Statutory And Judicial Foundations

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

13. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
14. Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 883 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862).
15. Ex parte Brinkerhoff, 1883 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 349, republished in New
Decisions, 27 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 797 (1945).
16. Asher Hodes, Diagnosing Patentable Subject Matter, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
225, 229 (2011).
17. Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. 107, 1954 WL 5537 (B.P.A.I. July 23,1954)
(concerning a patent on a method of using a pressure jet to inject medicine).
18. William J. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 651, 654 (1995).
19. Id. at 658-60.
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For most of the twentieth century, new and useful biomedical
process patents were valid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and enforceable
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a-b). Patent-eligible subject matter is defined
by § 101 of the U.S. Patent Act, and includes “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” 13 Notwithstanding this clear
statutory allowance for biomedical process patents, as early as 1862, a
patent on using ether as surgical anesthesia was struck down for lack
of novelty and obviousness in Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary.14
Ex parte Brinkerhoff subsequently expanded on the Morton
rationale, holding that “methods or modes of treatment of physicians
of certain diseases are not patentable” because granting patents for
treatment methods would inappropriately lead the public to believe
that a particular method would always produce the expected result. 15
As a result, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
blocked patents on most “medical methods and modes of treatment”
until 1954. 16 This changed when Brinkerhoff was overruled by Ex
parte Scherer on account of medical methods satisfying the subjectmatter eligibility criteria of a “useful process” of 35 U.S.C. § 101.17
However, as Noonan highlights, “[t]he Patent Office still suspiciously
scrutinized such patent applications, and required extra data of
efficacy in most cases.” 18 Following Scherer, though, countless
patents were issued on biomedical procedures, many of which are
closely related to natural laws and phenomena.19
Biomedical process patents became increasingly controversial in
the late twentieth century as infringement lawsuits threatened
physicians’ ability to provide quality medical care. For instance, a
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patent on a diagnostic method for Down’s syndrome attracted
widespread opposition after its owner asserted the patent against
medical providers throughout the 1990s.20 Around the same time,
the medical profession’s vocal opposition to infringement lawsuits
against ophthalmologists who performed medically necessary
surgeries brought to light certain undesirable consequences of
monopolies on medical processes.21 In Pallin v. Singer (1995), Dr.
Pallin, who tried to charge licensing fees for each use of his patented
process for cataract surgery, sued Dr. Singer for numerous counts of
In response, the American Academy of
infringement. 22
Ophthalmology expressed apprehension about “the frightening
potential of having to pay a royalty every time a patient’s temperature
was taken, if such a procedure was patented.” 23 In an unpublished
consent order, the District of Vermont invalidated some of the claims
of Dr. Pallin’s patent and enjoined it from being enforced.24 The
American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Society of
Cataract and Refractive Surgery subsequently issued statements
publicly denouncing the patenting of medical and surgical
procedures, bringing the issue to the attention of Congress; 25 their
sentiments have generally been echoed by other professional medical
societies. 26 Some characterized medical process patents as “an
unethical interference with patient care, a disruption of the medical
tradition of freely sharing advances with colleagues, and an

10/28/2013 10:59:23
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20. Hodes, supra note 16, at 230.
21. See generally Robert Gunderman & John Hammond, “Under the Knife” –
Patenting Surgical Procedures, THE ROCHESTER ENG’R 10 (Feb. 2009),
http://www.patenteducation.com/images/200902_Limited_Monopoly__Patenting_Surgical_Procedures.pdf.
22. Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050 (D. Vt. May 1, 1995).
23. Noonan, supra note 18, at 651 (citing Doctors’ Group Opposes Medical
Method Patents, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1994, A14).
24. Pallin v. Singer, 1996 WL 274407, *1.
25. Gunderman & Hammond, supra note 21, at 10.
26. The WMA explains that patents are not necessary to incentivize innovation in
medical procedures and that they can lead to higher costs of care, reduced
availability of physicians licensed to provide certain procedures, and physician
uncertainty about whether or not a particular procedure is patented. WMA
Statement on Patenting Medical Procedures, Adopted by the 51st World Medical
Assembly, Tel Aviv, Israel, Oct. 1999 and amended by the 60th WMA General
Assembly, New Delhi, India (Oct. 2009). The AMA ethics code also states that “[t]he
use of patents, trade secrets, confidentiality agreements, or other means to limit the
availability of medical procedures places significant limitation on the dissemination
of medical knowledge, and is therefore unethical.” AM. MED. ASS’N, Opinion 9.095 –
The Use of Patents and Other Means to Limit Availability of Medical Procedures, in
AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1996, updated 2007), http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medicalethics/opinion9095.page.
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unwelcome expense in a cost conscious modern medical
environment.” 27
In response to this public outcry, two new laws were proposed in
1995: H.R. 11272, the Medical Procedures Innovation and
Affordability Act, which would limit the use of USPTO funds available
to issue process patents; and S.1334, which would amend 35 U.S.C. §
271 to exempt medical practitioners from patent infringement
liability. 28 The proponents of these bills pointed out that “many
countries exclude therapeutic and diagnostic methods from patent
protection and that the United States should follow their lead and
‘harmonize’ [its] law with theirs.” 29 Opponents, however, successfully
blocked the bills, citing concerns over adverse effects on research and
development in the burgeoning biotech and diagnostic industries.30

B. Three Different Kinds of Biomedical Process Patents

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

27. Noonan, supra note 18, at 651-52.
28. Gunderman & Hammond, supra note 21, at 10.
29. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Notice of Hearings and Request for
Comments on Issues Relating to Patents Protection for Therapeutic and Diagnostic
Methods, 61 Fed. Reg. 10320 (Mar. 13, 1996).
30. Gunderman & Hammond, supra note 21, at 10.
31. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Medical-Process Patents –
Monopolizing the Delivery of Health Care, 355 NEW. ENGL. J. MED. 2036 (2006).
32. World Medical Ass’n, WMA Statement on Patenting Medical Procedures (as
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In understanding this debate, it is useful to consider the varying
degrees of association with patentable objects exhibited by three
general categories of patentable biomedical processes: (1) “pure”
processes, which include diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical
procedures not involving a patented medical product; (2) techniques
that are used to isolate or create potentially patentable medical
products like DNA; and (3) applications and uses of medical
products and compositions of matter, which include “new use”
claims. 31 The first of these categories, which does not involve
patentable objects, falls primarily within the domain of clinical
innovation. With the exception of a handful of non-essential
specialties which subsist primarily based on private payment—and, in
the absence of demand-generating insurance contracts, have stronger
incentives for establishing monopolies over their elective services—
the incentive rationale for “pure” process patents in the clinical
setting is weak as balanced against ethical considerations. The World
Medical Association (WMA) has explained that physicians already
have professional obligations and rewards for “attaining and
perfecting manual and intellectual skills.”32 Moreover, pure process
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patents present unique enforcement challenges because their
infringement—which is transitory (based on discrete acts) as opposed
to fixed (in a physical embodiment)—may be difficult to detect.
At the other end of the spectrum lies the third category of
biomedical processes, which directly rely on products and
compositions of matter.
Therefore, these processes primarily
implicate commercial innovation requiring substantial non-clinical
human and capital investment. Infringement suits in this realm focus
on the infringing use of both patented and off-patent products. 33
Notably, because these processes usually involve manufactured goods,
their licensing fees can more readily be built into the product
prices. 34
Somewhere along the middle of the spectrum these distinctions
become less apparent, particularly when the patentability of
associated products and compositions of matter is uncertain. This
uncertainty characterizes the second category of processes, which
predominantly includes processes directed at the patentable
manipulation, extraction, or imitation of biological materials.
Product claims directed at biological compounds that are associated
with measurement and information-related process claims cannot be
seamlessly incorporated into licensing fees, because the biological
materials involved are merely extracted from the body. At the same
time, while biotech innovations require large investments, they
receive substantial public funding 35 and are often developed with
significant academic contributions. 36

10/28/2013 10:59:23
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amended in 2009) http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/m30/.
33. E.g., Synvasive Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 425. F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (E.D. Cal.
2006) (surgical saw blades); Transonic Sys., Inc. v. Non-Invasive Med. Tech. Corp., 75
F. App’x 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (blood-flow measurement machine); Medtronic
Xomed, Inc. v. Gyrus ENT LLC, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1306-8 (M.D. Fla. 2006)
(apparatus used in the removal of noxious tissue). Many other examples involve
technologies used in eye surgeries. E.g., Advanced Med. Optics, Inc. v. Alcon Inc.,
361 F. Supp. 2d 370, 374 (D. Del. 2005); Koepnick Med. & Educ. Research Found.,
L.L.C. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 162 F. App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh’g denied (Jan. 25,
2006).
34. “If a drug or device has been patented, the licensing fee is incorporated into
the cost of the drug or device. Accordingly, the physician does not have to worry
about inadvertently infringing a drug or device patent, and physicians therefore are
not discouraged from using drugs or devices by legal uncertainty about patent
infringement.” AMA, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues in the
Patenting of Medical Procedures, 53 FOOD DRUG L.J. 341, 345 (1998).
35. Between 2003 and 2006, “the NIH funded $4.2 – 4.9 billion of genetics
research,” which makes genetics research “the sixth or seventh most funded research
area.” Jennifer Reineke Pohlhaus and Robert M. Cook-Deegan, Genomics Research:
World Survey of Public Funding, 9 BMC GENOMICS 472, 480 (2008).
36. See generally Lori Pressman, et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by Large
U.S. Academic Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31 (2006).
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The differences between the three categories of biomedical process
patents reveal limiting factors that might support differentiated
degrees of patent protection. The three categories of patentable
biomedical processes are in large part defined by their relationship to
potentially patentable products. While strong patent protections
appear most warranted for the third category of biomedical
processes, they appear least warranted for the first category. The
second category, covering most biotechnology, might be thought of
as falling somewhere in the middle, especially considering the
remaining uncertainties about the validity of process claims related to
isolated gDNA.

C. The Limited Physician’s Immunity Statute

38. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012).
39. Id. at 797-98.
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37. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies Under Patents on Medical and Surgical
Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 789, 794-95 (1996).

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 26 Side A

In the aftermath of the Pallin case, the differences among
biomedical process categories resulted in a brief Congressional
stalemate that was broken in 1996 with a narrower third bill. The
Physician’s Immunity Statute effectively carved out a narrow
immunity for physicians’ infringement of pure process patents while
preserving the subject-matter eligibility and infringement liability of
all types of biomedical process patents. To address concerns that
patents would obstruct the provision of medical care,
35 U.S.C. § 287—which establishes the conditions for liability for
patent infringement—was amended to prevent patent owners from
enforcing medical or surgical procedure patents against medical
practitioners. 37 The amendment, however, § 287(c) (“Limitation on
damages and other remedies; marking and notice”), excludes from
its immunity in the infringement of 1) patented products, 2)
patented uses of compositions of matter, and 3) biotech patents. 38
Several limitations of this amendment, which reflect some of the
aforementioned differences between process categories, are worth
highlighting. To address concerns about protecting research and
development investments in the growing biotech industry, “medical
activity” was explicitly defined to exclude from immunity biotech
processes alongside processes involving patented products, thereby
preserving the full scope of intellectual property rights for these
processes. 39
While the Physician’s Immunity Statute narrowly addressed some
of the unique characteristics of pure process patents that justify
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weaker enforcement rights, it was not calibrated to reflect similar
characteristics of the second and third categories of biomedical
process patents. First, the product and composition of matter claims
associated with certain biotech processes may not be patent eligible,
rendering these biotech processes more similar to pure processes.
Second, rents for biotech processes are not easily tied to objects that
can be sold and therefore defy traditional means of market
enforcement. 40 Several attempts to address these policy gaps through
legislation have failed to garner the necessary political support. 41 For
instance, the unsuccessful Genetic Research and Diagnostic
Accessibility Act attempted to carve out physicians’ infringement
liability for patented biotech processes, because “[e]xempting pure
process patents and biotechnology process patents from
infringement liability for physicians would cover correlations and
diagnostic and treatment methods that form the basis for
personalized medical care, an integral component to better and
more effective patient care.” 42 The following sections will further
develop the issues surrounding the doctrinal entanglement of
biotech process and composition of matter claims and how their
implications for biomedical preemption might otherwise be
addressed.
II. PRODUCT AND PROCESS ENTANGLEMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY

A. The Dual Nature of Biotech Patents

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

40. Moreover, the definition of medical provider is hazier in the realm of
biotechnology: because biotech processes involve both clinical and commercial
inputs, they are often performed by specialized biotechnology companies that work
with and serve medical providers. Therapeutic and surgical procedures, on the other
hand, more often necessitate simpler mechanical tools, compounds and implements,
and are therefore performed by medical practitioners in the traditional sense.
41. E.g., Animal and Gene Patent Moratorium Bill, S. 387, 103d Cong. (1993);
The Genomic Science and Technology Innovation Act of 2002, H.R. 3966, 107th
Cong. (2002); The Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R.
3967, 107th Cong. (2002).
42. J. Befeler, Seeking a Better Prescription for Physicians: Patent Eligibility for
Diagnostic Methods in a Post-Bilski and Prometheus Era, 35 SETON HALL LEG. J. 484,
514 (2012).
43. § 103 was rendered largely obsolete by In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
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Although it was repealed by the America Invents Act of 2011, 35
U.S.C. § 103(b) once provided the lone statutory definition of a
biotechnology process with respect to patents. 43 As set forth in a 1995
amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 103, a biotechnology process was defined
to include genetic alteration of organisms to express exogenous
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nucleotide sequences, manipulate the expression of endogenous
nucleotide sequences, and express non-naturally occurring
physiological characteristics; cell fusion to produce cell lines
expressing specific proteins; and methods of using products created
through biotechnology processes. 44 When set forth as part of the
Biotechnology Process Patent Act, this definition highlighted a legal
recognition that innovation in biotech processes is often driven by
discoveries concerning compositions of matter, which may themselves
be claimed as processes. 45 The critical consequence of this is the
recognition that biotech processes and compositions of matter may
overlap in the scope of their preemption of the use of natural laws
and natural phenomena. 46 As Burk explains, innovation in the
biotech industry relies on “the character of molecules as channels for
informational transfer processes,” and biotech patents are thus
“characterized as much by their processes as by their material makeup.” 47 Indeed, as Burk elaborates, this aspect of biotechnology may
be of greater consequence than in other realms, because biological
materials are “generally valued precisely because of their internal
process activity, which in turn typically constitutes the patentable
point of novelty.” 48 Thus, from an early stage, modern biotechnology
has relied heavily on process patents because the products of most
biotech processes—proteins—are usually not patentable. Process
claims are thus often used to indirectly protect otherwise unpatentable biotech products. 49
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44. Biotechnology Process Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 104-3 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §
103(b) (2006) (repealed 2011)).
45. For instance, § 103(B), “cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that
expresses a specific protein, such as a monoclonal antibody,” allows naturally
occurring products to be indirectly protected vis-à-vis the processes that yield them,
and § 103(C), “a method of using a product produced by a process defined by
subparagraph (A) or (B), or a combination of subparagraphs (A) and (B),” allows
naturally occurring products to be indirectly protected vis-à-vis their use. Defining
biotechnology in this way ensures that unpatentable biotech products can
nevertheless be indirectly protected through their associated processes.
46. As early as 1912, the Second Circuit recognized novelty in the invention of
purified biological materials might be tied to the discovery and manipulation of a law
of nature. In Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., the patentability of purified
adrenaline was upheld in what is now considered a foundational case in
biotechnology patent law. Even at this early stage in the development of the biotech
industry, the Second Circuit noted that “[i]t was important, if possible, to ascertain
what it was in these glands which possessed these physiological properties, whether it
was a ‘principle’ or a ‘condition,’ and if it were a ‘principle’ to isolate it from its
environment with other principles.” Parke-Davis & Co. v. H K Mulford & Co., 196 F.
496, 497 (2d Cir. 1912).
47. Burk, supra note 12, at 563, 568.
48. Id. at 568.
49. Kristin Connarn, Section 103(b): Obviously Unnecessary? 5 J. HIGH TECH. L.
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Diagnostic biotech processes doubly defy traditional doctrinal
boundaries: process and composition of matter claims become highly
dependent on each other as channels of information, and both
process and composition of matter claims become increasingly
inseparable from their natural underpinnings. Because the purpose
of a diagnostic biotech process is to produce information about the
body, diagnostic processes are largely based on natural laws. These
processes entail measurement procedures (e.g., calculations,
correlations, comparisons) that involve biological materials, which
may in turn be valuable primarily for the processes they host. As a
result, diagnostic biotech processes and their associated products
similarly serve to preempt the use of biological information (e.g., a
genetic sequence or correlation) and the compounds that encompass
this information (e.g., an isolated gene or expressed protein). As
Burk explains, it is not just the embodiment of information but
information flow that lies at the core of the web of overlapping claims
to diagnostic processes and compositions of matter:

Some commentators have thus raised concerns about the
preemptive effects of patent thickets, lack of transparency, and
uncertainty in the realm of diagnostic biotech processes.51 Others
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287, 291 (2005).
50. Id. at 587.
51. See generally Isabelle Huys et al., Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic
Diagnostic Testing, 27 NATURE BIOTECH. 903 (2009) (finding, in an analysis of 22
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[S]ince information is encoded as molecular structure, the
information is only useful when embodied in such structures,
which is to say that, ultimately, no one is really interested in
strings of human-readable letters—they are instead
interested in what can be done with the structures such
letters represent. And that in turn means that by necessity
they must be interested in building physical informational
structures—the molecules that are the conduit for
information transfer . . . The configuration of informational
molecules is based upon the interaction with, and so upon
the configuration of, precursor molecules. Because such
molecular structure is the channel by which information is
conveyed, the interaction of macromolecules is the point of
interest in biotechnology patenting—and “interactions”
should fall formally into the category of processes. But
molecular structure defines the parameters for such a
process, and structure falls formally into the category of
products. 50
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worry about monopolies over vital health information and patent
holdouts when diagnostic methods are exclusively licensed. 52
The interrelated nature of biotech process and composition of
matter claims has resulted in the legal entanglement of categorically
distinct biotech patent claims despite the (disputed) precedent of In
re Durden, 53 in which the Federal Circuit held that “each statutory
class of claims should be considered independently on its own
merits.” 54 In practice, a biotech process claim can never truly be
separated from the biological materials it implicates, and vice versa.
Moreover, the fast pace of technological re-definition of what
constitutes a process, due largely to progress in information
nanotechnology, has resulted in process patent jurisprudence
perennially struggling to keep up with the pace of innovation. At the
same time, the relatively abstract nature of processes (as compared to
compositions of matter) has prompted more inquiry into the subjectmatter eligibility of process patents.

B. Early Jurisprudence Concerning Chemical Processes and
Compounds

common genetic tests, that the precise scope of claims is often ambiguous).
52. “[T]he Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society
expressed concern that ‘patenting and exclusive licensing practices might have
limited the availability and quality of [patented genetic] tests’ . . . [and] that patents
for genetic tests may lead to ‘hold-outs,’ where ‘a single entity holding critical
technology may refuse to license or may charge what others regard as unfair or
disproportional fees even though it holds only one technology of many needed for a
clinically useful test.’” Margaret Kubick, An Uncertain Future: The Impact of

688, 695 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
54. In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
55. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (CCPA 1963).
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Medical Process and Diagnostic Method Patents on Healthcare in the United States,
9 NW. J. TECH. & INTEL. PROP. 280, 295 (2010); see also Robert Cook-Deegan & C.
Heaney, Gene Patents and Licensing: Case Studies Prepared for the Secretary’s
Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, 12 GENETIC MED. S1 (2010).
53. See In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (1995) (citing In re Dillon, 919 F.2d
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While patent claims on chemical compounds do not usually raise
doctrinal issues related to the preemption of natural phenomena
because they do not seek to imitate biology, cases concerning
chemical compounds illustrate an early pattern of entangling the
analysis of claims to processes and compositions of matter. In In re
Papesch, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
stated “a chemical compound and all of its properties are
inseparable. 55 And, as the Federal Circuit explained in In re Dillon, it
was the long-standing practice of the CCPA to join analyzing
chemical structures and properties in determining the patentability
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56. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
57. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
58. Burk, supra note 12, at 579.
59. “We find absolutely no warrant for the proposition that although Congress
intended that no patent be granted on a chemical compound whose sole ‘utility’
consists of its potential role as an object of use-testing, a different set of rules was
meant to apply to the process which yielded the unpatentable product. That
proposition seems to us little more than an attempt to evade the impact of the rules,
which concededly govern patentability of the product itself.” Brenner, 383 U.S. at
535.
60. In re Lunsford, 357 F.2d 380, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
61. In considering the patentability of a chemical process in In re Durden, the
Federal Circuit stated that “a new process may still be obvious, even when considered
‘as a whole,’ notwithstanding the specific starting material or resulting product, or
both, is not to be found in the prior art.” In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406, 1410 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). In considering the patentability of a chemical product in In re
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of chemical compounds. 56
In 1966, the Supreme Court considered the relationship between
chemical processes and their output. In Brenner v. Manson, the
Court was asked to review the rejection of a chemical process patent
with an output of undefined utility. The Court upheld the rejection,
explaining “a process patent in the chemical field, which has not
been developed and pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a
monopoly of knowledge which should be granted only if clearly
commanded by the statute.” 57 Due to the Court’s conclusion that a
process lacked utility if its end product lacked the requisite utility,
commentators noted that “this reasoning fail[ed] to maintain the
conceptual separation of invention between product and process.”58
However, this apparent conflation was not unintentional. On the
contrary, the Court recognized a strong rationale for consistency in
the patent rules applying equally to process and product patents
when they cover essentially the same subject matter, holding that a
process could not be patented if what it produced was not
patentable. 59 Finding itself in a position where the appropriate rule
governing patentability was directed at products rather than
processes, the Court nevertheless sought guidance in the spirit of the
law.
Similarly, in Application of Lunsford, the CCPA stated: “[W]e have
frequently found novel chemical processes producing the same
product, but in unexpectedly higher yields, to be patentable by
reason of that yield, a ‘matter of degree.’ Should not chemical
products, also displaying an unexpectedly higher degree of
effectiveness, be treated in like manner?” 60 The Federal Circuit later
attempted to address this and analogous questions in a string of cases
concerning naturally occurring compounds, 61 noting that often in
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such cases, “the compounds and their use are but different aspects of,
or ways of looking at, the same invention and consequently that
invention is capable of being claimed both as new compounds or as a
new method or process.” 62 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit was clear
that these cases did not produce rigid rules, but rather per se rules
that were highly context-dependent. 63

C. Issues Raised by Statutory Amendments in the Late Twentieth
Century

Pleuddemann, the Federal Circuit explained that “[w]hen a new and useful
compound or group of compounds is invented or discovered having a particular use
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10/28/2013 10:59:23

it is often the case that what is really a single invention may be viewed legally as
having three or more different aspects permitting it to be claimed in different ways,
for example: (1) the compounds themselves; (2) the method or process of making
the compounds; and (3) the method or process of using the compounds for their
intended purpose. 910 F.2d 823, 825-26 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
62. Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d at 827.
63. Connarn, supra note 49, at 296.
64. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§
9001-07, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563-67 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271, 287
(1988)).
65. Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1533 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
66. Burk, supra note 12, at 573.
67. See, e.g., Bio-Tech., 80 F.3d at 1556 (finding that human growth hormone
(hGH) was a product covered by patented process used to make the plasmids
necessary for the production of the hGH).
68. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 29 Side A

In 1988, the Process Patent Amendment Act (PPAA) further
narrowed the divide between process and product patents by
assigning process patent holders the right to exclude imported
products made by their patented process outside the U.S. 64 The
PPAA prompted a string of lawsuits in which biotech process patent
holders sued foreign entities for having used their patented processes
outside of the U.S. to manufacture and import to the U.S. the
products of these processes. 65 At the core of these cases was the
question of how biotech products—which, as cells and compounds,
were “essentially bags of chemical processes”—should be interpreted
under the PPAA. 66 The Federal Circuit ultimately adhered to a broad
definition of process, allowing the PPAA to cover those outputs that
were twice removed from the original process. 67 On the other hand,
when faced with the corresponding question of whether the PPAA
protected against the importation of “purely informational ‘products”
developed outside the U.S. using a patented process, the Federal
Circuit adhered to a narrow definition of product as a
“manufacture.” 68
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69. See generally Burk, supra note 12.
70. Id. at 573.
71. Id. at 574.
72. In In re Bell, the Federal Circuit reversed the PTO’s determination that
“amino acid sequence of a protein in conjunction with a reference indicating a
general method of cloning renders the gene prima facie obvious.” See In re Bell, 991
F.2d 781, 783 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
73. Act of Nov. 1, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 1, 109 Stat. 351, 351 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006, repealed 2011)).
74. Id.
75. Connarn, supra note 49 at 296 (citing In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565 (1995); In
re Brouwer, 77 F.3d 422 (1996); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (1995)).
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In his pioneering assessment of the problem of biotechnologies as
channels of information that straddle the boundaries between
process and composition of matter patents, Burk traces how the
muddled biotech process-product distinction replete in these
offshore infringement cases trickled into domestic infringement cases
concerning obviousness and utility. 69 Early obviousness cases
concerning renovated processes yielded a seemingly straightforward
outcome: processes were generally deemed un-patentable if the end
product was patentable but the starting material was not, whereas
processes were generally deemed patentable if the end product was
not patentable but the starting material was. 70 While the outcomes of
these cases could be more or less squared with each other, they
inconsistently bifurcated the novelty and non-obviousness inquiries
when dealing with comparable combinations of process and product
claims. 71 In any case, they did not offer much clarity for biotech
claims that were characterized by the ambiguous informational
correspondence between DNA, amino acid sequences, and the
proteins they encode.72
In 1995, the Biotechnology Process Patent Act (BPPA) amended 35
U.S.C. § 103 in an attempt to provide some certainty concerning how
to navigate the boundary-defying interactions between biotech
process and product claims. 73 The amendment established that nonobvious biotech processes, regardless of other precedent concerning
subject-matter eligibility, are patentable if they produce a nonobvious product subject to “timely election.” 74 Shortly after passage
of the BPPA, though, the Federal Circuit issued several opinions that
ultimately rendered the amendment obsolete by upholding the
primacy of per se rules for biotech patents, which offered far more
flexibility for the various degrees of association between processes
and compositions of matter. 75 By carving out a narrow solution, the
BPPA failed to foresee the various iterations of associated product
and process claims which could be exposed to additional grounds for
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invalidity challenges if they relied solely on § 103(b). 76 Connarn
points out that the “PTO even published a notice stating that the use
of § 103(b) should be rare,” and that § 103(b) “has never been
mentioned in any judicial or administrative decisions.” 77 The BPPA
was ultimately repealed in 2011 with the America Invents Act, 78 but its
legacy, as an attempt to simplify the increasingly confusing realm of
biotech process patents, survives as an undercurrent to today’s
uncertainties regarding the scope of patentable subject matter
limitations for the quickly evolving biotech industry.
III. SUBJECT-MATTER ELIGIBILITY AND THE NATURAL PHENOMENON
DOCTRINE

A. The Federal Circuit’s approach to subject-matter eligibility
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76. Id. at 299.
77. Id. at 301.
78. America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29 (2011).
79. See, e.g., In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
80. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
81. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
82. Samantak Ghosh, Prometheus and the Natural Phenomenon Doctrine: Let’s
Not Lose Sight of the Forest for the Trees, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 330,
336 (2012).
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The Federal Circuit’s chemical compound cases suggested that
process patents interlaced with separately patentable products defy
doctrinal clarity and therefore require context-specific analysis. In
this spirit, when faced with new technologies that did not fit neatly
into process patent rules, the CCPA and Federal Circuit developed
and refined analytical approaches to evaluate the subject-matter
eligibility of process claims. Particularly short-lived tests included the
technological arts test (which stated that methods—particularly
business methods—were patentable to the extent that they claimed
uses of computers or other electronic devices) 79 and the FreemanWalter-Abele test (which stated that a mathematical algorithm was
patentable if limited by physical elements or process steps as long as
these elements or steps amounted to more than post-solution
activity). 80 However a utility test introduced by the Federal Circuit in
1998 substantially broadened the patentability standards for
processes. 81 As Ghosh documents, by 2006, “patents on diagnostic
processes and isolated natural products were being routinely
granted.” 82 This facilitated a proliferation of medical process patents
and infringement lawsuits, which gradually helped refine the

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 30 Side B

10/28/2013 10:59:23

BENEDICT_MACROFINAL10-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

54

AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF

10/22/2013 2:38 PM

[Vol. 5:1

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

83. “The ‘643 application generally discloses that the five claimed ESTs may be
used in a variety of ways, including: (1) serving as a molecular marker for mapping
the entire maize genome, which consists of ten chromosomes that collectively
encompass roughly 50,000 genes; (2) measuring the level of mRNA in a tissue
sample via microarray technology to provide information about gene expression; (3)
providing a source for primers for use in the polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”)
process to enable rapid and inexpensive duplication of specific genes; (4) identifying
the presence or absence of a polymorphism; (5) isolating promoters via chromosome
walking; (6) controlling protein expression; and (7) locating genetic molecules of
other plants and organisms.” In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
84. Id. at 1370 (citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966)).
85. 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
86. Id. at 1361 (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F. 2d 894, 904 (1988)).
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contours of process patentability standards, especially as related to
biotechnology.
Faced with validity challenges to new technologies, the Federal
Circuit—rather than considering the subject-matter eligibility of
biotech process and product claims resembling natural
phenomena—adapted its analytical tests to fit the changing contours
of the biotech patents,. One of the key precedent-setting challenges
to biotech patents arose in 2005 in a case concerning the
patentability of expressed sequence tags (ESTs), short cDNA
transcripts for identifying nucleic acid sequences in maize genes. In
In re Fisher, the Federal Circuit held that a “laundry list” of research
applications could not impart sufficient § 101 utility on the ESTs in
the absence of any indication of “the precise structure or function of
either the genes or the proteins encoded for by those [maize]
genes.” 83 Even though Fisher concerned a composition of matter,
the Federal Circuit applied Brenner, which dealt with a process
patent, and concluded that the listed research processes did not
fulfill a requirement of specific utility because the utility of their
outputs was unclear. 84 In In re Kubin, the Federal Circuit—again
without addressing § 101 subject-matter eligibility—usefully
disentangled some confusion concerning the impact of prior art
Without considering
processes on genetic sequence claims. 85
whether or not Kubin’s application for a patent on an isolated DNA
sequence constituted a product of nature, the court invalidated the
patent as obvious, explaining that “the claimed invention was
reasonably expected in light of the prior art and ‘obvious to try.’” 86
The Federal Circuit alluded to a § 101 eligibility issue in King
Pharmaceuticals v. Eon Labs, in which it held that an “otherwise
anticipated” diagnostic claim does not become patentable simply
“because it includes a step of ‘informing’ someone about the
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existence of an inherent property of that method.” 87 While noting
that such a claim may constitute an abstract idea, the court stated that
“[t]he present case, however, does not present the proper vehicle for
determining whether claims covering medical treatment methods are
eligible for patenting under § 101 because even if claim 21 recites
patent eligible subject matter, that subject matter is anticipated for
the reasons discussed below.”88 In one sense, King’s reasoning was
reminiscent of Ex parte Brinkeroff’s distaste for patenting modes of
informing patients of a possible outcome, although it did not go so
far as to prohibit claims including an “informing” step, merely
holding that such a step could not itself impart patentability.89 Again,
though, the Federal Circuit’s flexibility in tailoring its analysis to the
technology in question precluded the need for broader inquiry into
the subject-matter eligibility of these overlapping process and
product claims.

B. Evolution of the Natural Phenomenon Doctrine in The Supreme
Court
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87. King Pharms. v. Eon Labs, 616 F.3d 1267, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1278-79.
90. See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).
91. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); see also Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3238-39, 3253 (2010).
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Unlike the patent-entrenched Federal Circuit, which has to
continuously adapt and respond to the demands of changing
technologies, the Supreme Court has a long history of assessing new
process patent questions through the theoretical lens of § 101
subject-matter eligibility. When confronted with challenges to
patents in emerging fields of technology, the Court has far more
often invoked the natural phenomenon doctrine, and it has done so
with little regard for doctrinal distinctions between processes and
products.
Derived from English common law, 90 the natural
phenomenon doctrine has been reaffirmed several times by the
Court as necessary to avoid unwarranted preemption of research and
innovation resulting from the monopolization of basic scientific tools,
namely, laws of nature, products of nature, and abstract ideas.91
In the earliest of these cases, O’Reilly v. Morse, a patent on the
telegraph was upheld even though it claimed the natural
phenomenon of using electromagnetism as a motive power, because
this was “combined with, and passed through, and operate[d] upon,
certain complicated and delicate machinery, adjusted and arranged
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92. 56 U.S. 62, 117 (1853).
93. 63 U.S. 132, 137 (1859).
94. “While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge
of scientific truth may be. But . . . [w]e assume, without deciding the point, that this
advance was invention even though it was achieved by the logical application of a
known scientific law to a familiar type of antenna. But it is apparent that if this
assumption is correct the invention was a narrow one . . . .” Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.
v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
95. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
96. Id. at 130.

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 31 Side B

upon philosophical principles, and prepared by the highest
mechanical skill.” 92 Similarly, in Le Roy v. Tatham, the Court upheld
the patentability of the discovery that lead would reunite perfectly
after separation under certain conditions, explaining that “[t]he
principle may be the new and valuable discovery, but the practical
application of it to some useful purpose is the test of its value,” and
thus, inventiveness. 93 In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio
Corp. of America, the Court relied on the natural phenomenon
doctrine to narrowly construe a patent claim, limiting its scope to its
specific inventive application of a scientific formula for wavelength
positioning in antennae. 94 While these cases help illustrate the
Court’s early precedent concerning the natural phenomenon
doctrine, they stopped short of explaining its underlying rationale,
because it was not ultimately found to control the questions at bar.
In 1948 the Supreme Court had the occasion to provide a more
explicit basis for the natural phenomenon doctrine. In Funk Bros.
Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, the Court invalidated a patent claim on a
mixed culture of bacterial strains chosen for their ability to convert
environmental nitrogen into a usable form without adversely
affecting the effectiveness of the mixture’s other strains of bacteria. 95
While the patent claims in Funk Bros. concerned a composition of
matter, they effectively preempted the process of using several
complementary bacterial strains to promote the useful conversion of
nitrogen. In its decision, the Court explained that “[t]he qualities of
these bacteria, like . . . the qualities of metals, are part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws
of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none,” and that
their combination was nothing more than a basic application in the
form of packaging. 96 Even though the new combination of bacterial
strains held significant advantages over the individual strains found in
nature, the constituent parts of the invention ultimately did little
more than “serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite
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Id. at 131.
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 67.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
Id. at 589.
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independently of any effort of the patentee.” 97 To some extent, Funk
Bros. left courts with some flexibility in defining to what extent a
natural phenomenon’s use would have to be “dependent” on the
handiwork of the inventor in order to be patentable. This inquiry
turns out to be critical for diagnostic biotech processes, which also
harness natural phenomena to more efficiently undertake reactions
that might not be observed as a whole in nature, although each
constituent part acts as it would in nature when interacting with other
parts of the process.
The next few times the Supreme Court invoked the natural
phenomenon doctrine, it did not hesitate to interchangeably apply
precedent concerning product claims to process claims, and later on,
vice versa. In Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court rejected a patent on an
algorithm for binary conversion, explaining that “mental processes,
and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the
basic tools of scientific and technological work.” 98 The Court cited
Funk Bros. in support of this rule, acknowledging as an aside that
although it “dealt there with a ‘product’ claim, while the present case
deals with a ‘process’ claim . . . the same principle applies.” 99 Because
the algorithm in question had “no substantial practical application
except in connection with a digital computer,” the Court found that
upholding its patent “would wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm
itself.” 100 The Court likened the claimed process to a law of nature
and thus invalidated it, albeit stopping short of finding that the
individual claims themselves merely embodied laws of nature.101
Similarly, in Parker v. Flook, the Court invalidated a patent on a
method for updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion by
means of a mathematical algorithm. 102 Because all the non-formulaic
elements of the patent claims were not novel, the patentability
inquiry focused on the application of the independently
unpatentable formula. The Court explained that Mackay Radio and
Funk Bros. governed even though those cases concerned product
patents, thereby “foreclos[ing] a purely literal reading of § 101,” 103
and emphasizing that “[t]he underlying notion is that a scientific

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 32 Side B

10/28/2013 10:59:23

BENEDICT_MACROFINAL10-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

58

AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF

10/22/2013 2:38 PM

[Vol. 5:1

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

104. Id. at 593 n.15; In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (adding that “[t]his insight . . . is at the
core of the judicial doctrine by which laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas are excluded from patentable subject matter.”).
105. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591.
106. Id. at 586.
107. Id. at 590.
108. Id. at 596 (“It is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in
light of our prior precedents, and we must proceed cautiously when we are asked to
extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress.”).
109. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 176 (1981).
110. Id. at 187, 191-93.
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principle . . . reveals a relationship that has always existed.”104 The
Court held that “[t]he process itself, not merely the mathematical
algorithm, must be new and useful”; as a law of nature, the formula
could only be patented via an inventive application of it. 105
Notwithstanding the novelty of applying the formula to the particular
process of calculating alarm limit values, the Court found that such
an application was not sufficiently novel, as its effect on the alarm
limits was limited to the effect of the equation. Considering the
preemptive effect of allowing the patent to stand, the Court
explained that even though the claims did not “cover every
conceivable application of the formula,” 106 these “post-solution”
applications could not “transform an unpatentable principle into a
patentable process.” 107 As in Benson, the Court’s interpretation of
the natural phenomenon doctrine to preclude patentability in this
case was not self-evident, and it was accompanied by a harsh dissent.
However, the Court explained that it was wary of unprecedentedly
expanding the scope of patentable subject matter. 108
The Supreme Court retreated somewhat from its approach in
Flook in Diamond v. Diehr. Explaining that patentability should be
assessed as a whole rather than in parts, the Court upheld the
patentability of a rubber curing process involving a thermodynamic
equation. 109 Surviving a natural phenomenon analysis, the process
patent was deemed valid because it did not simply apply a natural
principle to a specific context, wherein “insignificant post-solution
activity [would] not transform an unpatentable principle into a
patentable process” (as was the case in Flook); it was also tied to a
rubber-curing machine, and therefore only sought to “pre-empt the
use of that equation . . . in conjunction with all of the other steps.” 110
The outcome in Diehr differed from that in Flook only because the
anchoring structure itself in Diehr passed the test for novelty, thereby
limiting the scope of unwarranted preemption. As Hodes explains,
“[n]arrowing the scope of the method patent by coupling it to a
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Hodes, supra note 16, at 227-28.
548 U.S. 124 (2006) [hereinafter Labcorp].
Id, at 125.
Hodes, supra note 16, at 230-31.
Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.

Id.
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, LabCorp, 548 U.S. 124 (No. 04-607).
Brief for Respondents at 46, LabCorp, 548 U.S. 124 (No. 04-607).
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111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
2004).
116.
117.
118.
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specific ‘structure or process’ within the scope of patent-eligible
subject matter minimized the danger that patents would cover pure
knowledge of the world and hinder harvesting the fruits of such
knowledge.” 111
In 2006, the Supreme Court granted cert in Laboratory Corp. v.
Metabolite, 112 a case about the patentability of a natural correlation,
but ultimately dismissed the petition as improvidently granted. 113 It is
speculated that the Court dismissed the petition because the issue of
patentable subject matter raised on appeal was not properly argued
in the lower courts. 114 The dismissal was somewhat remarkable
because, by this time, the quickly growing biotech industry was eager
for certainty regarding the strength of diagnostic process patents.
Upheld by the Federal Circuit, LabCorp concerned a patented
process of diagnosing vitamin deficiencies by measuring
homocysteine levels in the blood through a correlation with B
vitamins using any homocysteine-specific testing method. 115
Laboratory Corporation was held liable for inducing infringement by
encouraging doctors to order tests for measuring homocysteine, and
it was enjoined from using homocysteine-only tests to detect vitamin
deficiency. 116 In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Laboratory
Corporation argued that the diagnostic correlations, as laws of
nature, were not patentable under the natural phenomenon
doctrine’s exception to § 101. 117 In response, Metabolite argued that
overturning the patentability of correlations between disease states
and biomarkers could have far-reaching negative effects, including
the invalidation of all drug patents, as such patents merely discover
certain chemical interactions in the body. 118 These concerns,
however, were likely unfounded; chemical processes and products
differ significantly from their biochemical counterparts because they
generally correlate and interact with biology rather than replicate
and imitate biology. Three justices dissented to the Court’s dismissal,
with Justice Breyer rejecting the State Street Bank utility test and
calling for a weaker machine-or-transformation test (discussed in the
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Justice Breyer explained that the mere
following section). 119
transformation of a blood sample, which was not the focus of the
patent’s diagnostic correlation claims, did not render the claims
subject-matter eligible.120 Notably, he expressed concern about the
preemptive scope of diagnostic process patents that could serve as
barriers to physicians’ ability to freely and efficiently exercise their
best medical judgment, unencumbered by licensing arrangements
and patent searches that would raise the cost of health care. 121
Importantly, Justice Breyer noted that “[p]atent law seeks to avoid the
dangers of overprotection just as surely as it seeks to avoid the
diminished incentive to invent that underprotection can threaten,” 122
emphasizing the relevance of the scope of preemption of scientific
principles.

C. Subject-Matter Eligibility Revisited by The Federal Circuit

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

119. Infra Part III.C.
120. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 135-36
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 138.
122. Id. at 127.
123. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom.
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
124. See id. at 971-72.
125. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (citing Brief for Business Software Alliance 24–25;
Brief for Biotech. Industry Org. et al. 14–27; Brief for Boston Patent Law Ass’n 8–15;
Brief for Houston Intellectual Property Law Ass’n 17–22; Brief for Dolby Labs., Inc.,
et al. 9–10).
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Two years later, with In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit reconsidered
the dominant test for patent-eligible subject matter in a case
concerning business methods. In striking down a patent on a
business method as an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit held that the
machine-or-transformation (M-o-T) test was the ultimate test for
process claim subject-matter eligibility under § 101.123 The M-o-T
test, derived from nineteenth century common law, deemed
patentable any process that either involves a patented machine (e.g.,
device, apparatus, or computer) or significantly transforms an article
from one state to another, and in doing so attempts to distinguish
monopolies on fundamental principles from monopolies on
applications of fundamental principles.124 The Supreme Court
considered the M-o-T test in Bilski v. Kappos, noting that several
amicus briefs shared a concern that continued reliance on the M-o-T
test would increase uncertainty, particularly “as to the patentability of
software, [and] advanced diagnostic medicine techniques.” 125 In
Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court upheld the outcome of In re
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126. See, e.g., id.
127. For an analysis of how the machine-or-transformation test can be usefully
supplemented by earlier judicial tests, see Jennifer L. Davis, Patent Law –

Patentability Post-Bilski: No Need to Throw the Baby out with the Bath Water when
Determining Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE
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ROCK L. REV. 421 (2012).
128. Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3238-39 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, J.J.,
concurring) (“The Court also accepts that we have ‘foreclose[d] a purely literal
reading of § 101,’ Flook, . . . by holding that claims that are close to ‘laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,’ Diamond v. Diehr, . . . do not count as
‘processes’ under § 101, even if they can be colloquially described as such.”).
129. Id. at 3222 (majority opinion).
130. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control?
Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES.
J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 4-5 (2012), cited in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012).
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Bilski, but clarified that the M-o-T test was merely one analytical
approach to subject-matter eligibility that should be understood as “a
useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining
whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101.”126 By
relegating the M-o-T test to be just one of several considerations,
Kappos both broadened subject-matter eligibility (by removing the
strict requirement for a machine or transformation) and narrowed it
(by establishing that the presence of a machine or transformation was
no longer sufficient). 127 At the same time, Kappos reaffirmed the
distinction between the subject-matter eligibility threshold (in
determining whether or not something qualifies as a process), and
the other statutory requirements of patentability, a distinction that is
easily muddled when patentability requirements can be calibrated to
have the same limiting effect as subject-matter eligibility standards.
Interestingly, Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Kappos intimated that
the natural phenomenon doctrine might apply beyond exact replicas
of nature 128
While tempering the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the M-o-T test,
the Supreme Court noted that its opinion should not “be read as
endorsing the Federal Circuit’s past interpretations of § 101,” 129
Indeed, as the Federal Circuit has dealt with the changing pace of
technological innovation by creating short-lived tests suitable for
determining the questions at hand, the Supreme Court has generally
not adopted these tests as controlling law. Rather, on several notable
occasions, it has tempered the role of these tests via the “catch-all”
natural phenomenon doctrine’s ambiguous but flexible contours for
fast-changing technology. 130 The Federal Circuit sorted out some of
the implications of Kappos for biotechnology with Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, which the Supreme Court
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131. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F. 3d 1057, 1067 (2011).
132. Id. at 1066-67. Hodes explains that controversy surrounding the possible
presence of a substantively valid transformation in the claims might have been
usefully expounded in LabCorp with relevance to the natural phenomenon doctrine:
“Several commentators have noted that vaccinations transform a patient by
conferring immunity. However, the Classen vaccination step is not performed on an
actual patient to protect him or her from a specific disease. Instead it is performed
on a generic research subject. Indeed, the Classen patent appears to claim merely
the performance of a controlled experiment in the field of minimizing vaccineinduced autoimmune reactions. Thus, the Classen transformation might be judged
ancillary, insignificant, extra-solution activity. This centrality standard might serve to
distinguish processes that produce a direct patient benefit from those that are
research tools.” Hodes, supra note 16 at 232.
133. Ghosh, supra note 82, at 333 (quoting Richard Seth Gipstein, The Isolation
and Purification Exception to the General Unpatentability of Products of Nature, 4
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2, 3 (2003)) (“Since the precise foundation of the
natural phenomenon doctrine ‘remains somewhat ambiguous [it] leaves the limits of
the doctrine lacking proper delineation’ causing much confusion.”).
134. Ghosh, supra note 82, at 332.
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remanded to be reconsidered in light of Kappos. 131 Classen
concerned a patent on a general process for determining ideal
immunization schedules, which the Federal Circuit had previously
found failed the M-o-T test. The Federal Circuit reversed its position
and upheld the subject-matter eligibility of two claims that were
“directed to a specific, tangible application”—because they claimed
“a method of lowering the risk of chronic immune-mediated
disorder, including the physical step of immunization on the
determined schedule”—but rejected the patent eligibility of a third
claim which, in the absence of a physical immunization step, was
merely an “abstract principle that variation in immunization
schedules may have consequences for certain diseases.” 132
Not surprisingly, the confines of what is considered to be a natural
phenomenon are inherently hazy. 133 Nevertheless, the natural
phenomenon doctrine can be an important safeguard to functionally
overlapping patent claims that unreasonably preempt the use of
natural phenomena, as the jurisprudence surrounding the doctrine
has developed interchangeably between product and process claims.
Because the Supreme Court is far less involved in the continuous
doctrinal recalibration needed to adjust to new technologies, it “has
used the doctrine to expand and contract the scope of patentability
in response to the changes in technology and socio-economic
factors.” 134 By reflecting the spirit of the law, patentable subject
matter rules can be particularly useful for assessing patents covering
relatively new technologies that may not fit neatly into existing
analytical frameworks. If they are well-defined, “[p]atentable subject
matter boundaries can help to minimize uniformity costs by limiting
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the diversity of innovations that patent law covers, thus making it
easier to achieve a more optimal level of protection for a narrower
range of innovations.” 135 Moreover, to the extent that it can serve the
purpose of avoiding unwarranted preemption, the natural
phenomenon doctrine substantially reflects the utilitarian theory of
intellectual property, 136 which the Court cited in Kappos while
considering the constitutionally mandated purpose of the patent
system. 137
Because the Supreme Court has applied the rationale for the
natural phenomenon doctrine to processes and products alike, it
appears highly compatible with some of the issues raised by
diagnostic biotech patents. Diagnostic biotechnology is still a
relatively new area characterized by special challenges that arise in
assessing the extent to which a patentee has manipulated natural
processes at the core of diagnostic innovations. In this realm, the
undeniable relationship between information and biology makes a
compelling case for reliance on the natural phenomenon doctrine.
Because biotechnology inevitably defies traditional categories, the
catch-all nature of the natural phenomenon doctrine renders it
suitable for pressing subject-matter eligibility questions that remain
unanswered.
IV. MAYO, MYRIAD AND THE WAY FORWARD

A. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

135. Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 48.
136. See, e.g., David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law
Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1
(2009).
137. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3254 (2010) (citing Id.).
138. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303
(2012).

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 35 Side A

Last year, in Mayo v. Prometheus, the Supreme Court used the
natural phenomenon doctrine to bar the subject-matter eligibility of
natural correlations used in a diagnostic process. Responding to the
Federal Circuit’s continued reliance on the M-o-T test in spite of
Kappos, the Court clarified that the natural phenomenon doctrine
always trumps the M-o-T test. 138 The Court invalidated Prometheus’s
patent on a diagnostic method that involved administering
thiopurines and observing chemical reactions in the body as a basis
for dosing advice, stating that the patent improperly claimed a
natural law. The claimed natural laws could not rise to the level of
patentable subject matter by being limited to a particular
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Id. at 1292.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.
Id. at 1301.
Margaret Kubick, An Uncertain Future: The Impact of Medical Process and
Diagnostic Method Patents on Healthcare in the United States, 9 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 280, 290 (2010) (quoting Corrected Amici Curiae Brief for the Am.
Coll. of Med. Genetics et al. in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 9, Prometheus
Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
144. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302, 1305.
145. Am. Med. Ass’n, Statement, AMA Welcomes Supreme Court Decision to
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technological environment or by “simply appending conventional
steps, specified at a high level of generality, to laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas.” 139 Echoing Flook, 140 Justice Breyer
explained that “a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of
nature, mathematical formulas and the like . . . serves as a somewhat
more easily administered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’
concern,” noting that “the underlying functional concern here is a
relative one: how much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the
contribution of the inventor.” 141 Justice Breyer explained that the
danger of process patents tying up future innovation becomes acute
when a patent “forecloses more future invention than the underlying
discovery could reasonably justify.” 142
According to amicus briefs filed in an earlier appeal, Prometheus’s
overly broad patent—like the Pallin patent that led to the Physician’s
Immunity Statute—would have increased healthcare costs and
decreased treatment effectiveness by interfering with physicians’
ability “to make informed treatment decisions based on the latest
scientific knowledge.” 143 The Court weighed this and other concerns
regarding preemption of future personalized medicine research
against concerns about disincentivizing biotech and diagnostic
research. Building on the arguments laid out in his dissenting
opinion in LabCorp, Justice Breyer explained that the process
claim—especially the “highly general” step instructing physicians to
“determine” metabolite levels—would “threaten to inhibit the
development of more refined treatment recommendations that
combine Prometheus’[s] correlations with later discovered features
of the metabolites, human physiology or individual patient
characteristics,” while leaving unanswered the question of “whether,
from a policy perspective, increased protection for discoveries of
diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.” 144 The AMA welcomed the
decision by stating that it prevented harm to patient care by
protecting the availability of “critical scientific data” necessary for
“sound patient care and innovative medical research.” 145 In a way,
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Mayo categorized Prometheus’s biotech process patent as a pure
process, thereby addressing one of the policy gaps left by the
Physician’s Immunity Statute.

B. Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office
After issuing its decision in Mayo, the Supreme Court remanded
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., to be
reconsidered in light of Mayo. 146 Prior to Mayo, the Federal Circuit

C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

Invalidate
Prometheus
Patents
(Mar.
20,
2012),
http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2012-03-20-supreme-court-decision-prometheuspatents.page(quoted by THOMAS, supra note 5, at 10) (original source no longer
accessible).
146. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (AMP v.
USPTO), 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
147. AMP v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1354 (2011).
148. AMP v USPTO, 653 F.3d at 1357-58.
149. AMP v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1334 (2012).
150. Id. at 1331.
151. Id. at 1325.
152. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972).
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had invalidated Myriad’s process claims directed at “comparing” and
“analyzing” BRCA sequences as unpatentable abstract ideas. 147 What
remained valid amongst the challenged claims were one method
claim, “a method for screening potential cancer therapeutics,” and
composition of matter claims covering the isolated gDNA and cDNA
sequences for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes (mutations of which are
correlated with breast and ovarian cancer risk). 148
In its decision on remand, the Federal Circuit reinstated its
original disposition in its entirety. 149 The majority, written by Judge
Lourie, explained that Myriad’s “composition claims are mere
reflections of a law of nature . . . they are not, any more than any
product of man reflects and is consistent with a law of nature,” 150 and
therefore, Mayo’s process patent analysis did “not control the
question of patent-eligibility of . . . claims to compositions of
matter.” 151
Yet, as detailed at length above, this categorical
distinction of precedent is hardly a bright line. When the Supreme
Court invoked Funk Bros. to apply the natural phenomenon doctrine
to Benson, it clearly stated that for either a process or product, “the
same principle applies.” 152 As demonstrated in the previous section,
this approach generally runs through Supreme Court precedent
concerning the natural phenomenon doctrine. Moreover, regardless
of whether or not they precisely claim laws or products of nature,
Myriad’s patents to isolated gDNA and cDNA effectively serve to
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153. AMP v. USPTO, 689 F.3d at 1355 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
154. AMP v. USPTO, rev’d sub nom Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc. (Myriad), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012)
(No. 12-398).
155. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1292
(2012).
156. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetic, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2118.
157. Id. at 1119.
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preempt the use of both naturally occurring compositions of matter
(genes) and laws of nature (the information coded for by genetic
sequences). In a dissenting opinion to the Federal Circuit’s decision,
Judge Bryson explained that when a patent “claims a composition of
matter that is nearly identical to a product of nature, it is appropriate
to ask whether the applicant has done ‘enough’ to distinguish his
alleged invention from the similar product of nature,” concluding
that Myriad had not made a substantial “inventive contribution” or
claimed anything more than a combination of “well-understood,
routine, conventional” elements. 153
The Federal Circuit’s holding was again appealed and granted
certiorari, this time on the single question of whether or not human
genes are patentable. 154 This time, Mayo’s suggestion that case law
concerning the natural phenomenon doctrine is primarily driven by
an avoidance of tying up the basic tools of science, rather than clear
categorical exceptions, 155 was found to be relevant to the question of
patent-eligibility. In a unanimous ruling (with the exception of some
minor concurrences by Justice Scalia on biological explanations),
Justice Thomas explained that isolated human gDNA is not patent
eligible subject matter under § 101 because it constitutes a law of
nature. Specifically, the Court explained that: Myriad did not invent
anything by isolating or locating the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but
rather identified what already exists in nature; the relevant “patent
descriptions simply detail the ‘iterative process’ of discovery by which
Myriad narrowed the possible locations for the gene sequences that it
sought;” the claims to isolated gDNA seek to cover the information
contained in a genetic sequence rather than chemical compositions
themselves; and deference to past USPTO practice was not persuasive
in the absence of explicit statutory support for the patentability of
isolated gDNA. 156 In contrast, the Court explained that cDNA—with
the exception of very short strands free from intervening introns—is
patentable because it differs from naturally occurring DNA, which
contains both introns and exons. 157
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C. Re-Envisioning the Natural Phenomenon Doctrine’s Preemption
Rationale
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158. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.
159. Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility – a Disease and a Cure, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 387, 401 (2011).
160. The argument against patentability may resound more strongly if a patent
claim on an extraction or imitation of a physical phenomenon preempts not only its
own use, but also the use of other laws of nature, as plaintiffs claim that Myriad’s
gene patents do. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 13-17, Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) [hereinafter Myriad].
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While Justice Breyer’s observation in Mayo that “a bright-line
prohibition against patenting laws of nature . . . serves as a somewhat
more easily administered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’
concern” 158 is merely dicta, it suggests that the natural phenomenon
doctrine is more concerned with the invention-preemption ratio than
categorical limitations. In other words, the doctrine may apply where
a physical phenomenon preempts the use of a law of nature, or where
an isolated version or a close replica of a physical phenomenon
preempts the use of that phenomenon beyond what is warranted by
the scope of invention. Along these lines, Yu has argued that perhaps
isolated DNA should not be patented simply because it constitutes a
source of biological information, even if it is not literally and exactly a
physical phenomenon, law of nature or abstract idea. As Yu explains,
it is not clear that diagnostic innovations—which essentially look to
nature for greater knowledge about the human body and then
leverage this knowledge to track and diagnose disease—can be
viewed as “inventions” rather than restatements of natural laws. 159
Under this approach, which echoes Flook (and, similarly, Justice
Stevens’ concurrence in Bilski), an isolated version or a mirror image
of a natural phenomenon—if it embodies naturally occurring
information—would not be subject-matter eligible if issuing a patent
on it would result in the preemption of all uses of that information. 160
Such an approach defers to the spirit of the law, which more
flexibly reaches those scientific advances that unpredictably redefine
how medical technology interacts with nature. As long as the biotech
industry is more interested in designing around nature than using
nature itself, a literal reading of the natural phenomenon doctrine
would render it ineffective in barring monopolies that technically
cover imitations of nature but effectively preempt uses of nature
itself. Feldman explains how this state of the art, which favors nonnaturally occurring phenomena over their naturally occurring
counterparts, is embodied in cDNA:
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cDNA does not normally exist in the human body, and is
naturally created only through the operation of certain
retroviruses. Transforming normal DNA into cDNA,
however, provides a more efficient tool for researchers and
health care professionals who wish to study, diagnose, and
treat the disease associated with a gene. In particular, cDNA
is tailored to work with bacteria, the organisms commonly
used to manipulate human genes and proteins in a
laboratory setting. Bacteria do not have the machinery to
shorten natural DNA, so we have to create special
uninterrupted coding sequences for them. If given an
uninterrupted coding sequence, bacteria can translate that
sequence into the proper protein. Another advantage of
cDNA over natural DNA is that the shorter length makes
many laboratory procedures possible that could not be
performed effectively with natural, full-length DNA. 161

161. Robin Feldman, Whose Body Is It Anyway? Human Cells and the Strange
Effects of Property and Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1388 (2010-
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2011).
162.
163.
164.
165.
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While there are a handful of other less efficient applications for
naturally occurring gDNA, such as whole genome sequencing, most
of these, if used to provide BRCA results, would “inevitably ‘isolate’
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes,” 162 offten creating, at least transitorily,
BRCA1 and BRCA2 cDNA in the process.
After Myriad, cDNA patents are ideally positioned to nevertheless
effectively monopolize the natural phenomena reflected in gDNA
sequences. In Myriad, the scope of preemption at issue was “the
genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.” 163
While this information may be preempted both by patents on isolated
gDNA and isolated cDNA, the Supreme Court only found isolated
gDNA to fail the subject matter eligibility threshold. Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court, explained that the lab technician
unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made.”164
However it is clear that Justice Thomas did not equate “something
new” with “something novel,” as he qualified the statement by
clarifying in a footnote that the Court “express[es] no opinion
whether cDNA satisfies the other statutory requirements of
patentability.” 165 And there are strong arguments that isolated cDNA
may fail these requirements. To make isolated cDNA, the isolated

Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 160, at 15.
Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at, 2109-10.
Id. at 2110.
Id. at 2119.
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166. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v.
Ambry Genetics Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00640-RJS (D. Utah July 9, 2013); Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Gene by Gene, Ltd., No.
2:13-cv-00643-EJF (D. Utah, July 10, 2013).
167. See discussion of In re Kubin, supra note 87, King Pharms, Inc. v. Eon Labs,
Inc., supra note 89, and Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., supra
note 116.
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gDNA is merely diluted in a specialized salt water mix, to which
primers and a reverse transcriptase are added. A PCR machine then
processes the solution after creating amplified cDNA through a
process of heating and cooling. This process is well known in the art;
here, as with the isolated gDNA, the principle contribution of the
inventor is in locating the gene. In Myriad, this inventive step, in the
absence of any transformation from naturally occurring genes, was
found to not be commensurate with the scope of preemption that
would result from a patent on the isolated gDNA. While the same
conclusion might have been reached with regard to the cDNA, the
analysis was not undertaken because, given the transformative step of
removing introns, the cDNA did not resemble naturally occurring
DNA.
It is important to recognize that claims to cDNA monopolize the
same genetic code as isolated gDNA; there is no difference between
the information monopolized by a patent on isolated gDNA and one
on cDNA because they both code for the same thing. To a large
extent, the same can be said of process claims involving cDNA and
gDNA if they cover the only useful applications of isolated DNA.
Reinforcing Justice Thomas’s point about monopolizing information
rather than molecular structures, Myriad has initiated infringement
suits against several companies that have begun producing BRCA1/2
diagnostic tests that purport to use only the isolated gDNA of BRCA
1/2. 166 By maintaining its patent claims on cDNA and processes
necessary for using isolated gDNA and cDNA, Myriad can effectively
monopolize the same subject matter as it could with the isolated
gDNA patents, because both isolated gDNA and cDNA are required
for steps in the biotech process of diagnosing genetic susceptibility to
breast and ovarian cancer. This feature of biotechnology products—
that renders them, primarily and essentially components of useful
processes—is precisely what justifies a greater focus on the inventionpreemption ratio.
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Part III of this article,
patentability requirements can be used to have the same limiting
effect as patent eligibility standards. 167 Prior to Myriad, it was the
long-held practice of the USPTO to grant patents on isolated gDNA.
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189 F. 95, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
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C M
Y K

10/28/2013 10:59:23

702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 224-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Jon M. Harkness, Dicta on Adrenaline: Myriad Problems with Learned
Hand’s Product-of-Nature Pronouncements in Parke-Davis v. Mulford, 93 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 363 (2011).
172. 450 U.S. 175, 204 (1981) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-95 (1978))
(explaining that “the algorithm is treated for § 101 purposes as though it were a
familiar part of the prior art; the claim is then examined to determine whether it
discloses “some other inventive concept.’”).
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It had been widely believed that because human DNA does not exist
in nature in isolated form, isolated gDNA could be patented on the
grounds that it is a product of human ingenuity. This view relied on
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., in which Judge Learned Hand
found a patent on isolated adrenaline to be valid, noting that the
inventor “was the first to make it available for any use by removing it
from the other gland-tissue in which it was found, and, while it is of
course possible logically to call this a purification of the principle, it
became for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and
therapeutically.” 168 New life was breathed into Judge Learned Hand’s
conclusion when the Federal Circuit cited it approvingly in finding
purified vitamin B-12 to be patent-eligible subject matter. 169
However, as Judge Sweet noted in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
USPTO, Judge Learned Hand’s conclusion about the patentability of
purified substances was merely dicta, as the question before him was
one of novelty, not subject-matter eligibility. 170 As Harkness points
out, the historical reliance on Parke-Davis for the assertion that
isolated products of nature are patent-eligible subject-matter is
fundamentally misguided, because the inventor in that case had
already convinced the patent examiner that the isolated compound
was physically distinct from the non-isolated one.171
Thus, it is still possible that biotech patent standards may be
calibrated to appropriately reflect the product-process entanglement
of biotech claims. In response to Myriad’s infringement suits,
allegedly infringing companies can defend themselves by challenging
Myriad’s patents on cDNA, such as claim 6 of the ‘282 patent (“An
isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 2
[which, referencing SEQ ID NO:1, covers cDNA]”) on the grounds of
novelty or written description. A novelty challenge could take the
approach of considering the knowledge about the location and
sequence of the BRCA 1/2 genes to be in the prior art. Applying
Diamond v. Diehr, 172 an alleged infringer of Myriad’s cDNA patents
could argue that the precise location of the BRCA 1/2, as
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173. A search of the NIH Basic Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST) for the
third line of SEQ ID NO: 1 reveals that nearly every human chromosome contains a
15mer found in that section of the sequence. BLAST (accessed on July 19, 2013),
http://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi?PAGE_TYPE=BlastSearch&PROG_DEF=blast
n&
BLAST_PROG_DEF=megaBlast&SHOW_DEFAULTS=on&SHOW_DEFAULTS=on&
BLAST_SPEC=OGP__9606__9558.
174. U.S. Pat. 5,622,829 (filed Apr. 19, 1995).
175. Jeffrey Rosenfeld & Christopher E. Mason, Pervasive Sequence Patents Cover
the Entire Human Genome, 5 GENOMIC MED. 27 (2013).
176. “A method for diagnosing a predisposition for breast cancer in a human
subject which comprises comparing the germline sequence of the BRCA2 gene or
the sequence of its mRNA in a tissue sample from said subject with the germline
sequence of the wild-type BRCA2 gene or the sequence of its mRNA, wherein an
alteration in the germline sequence of the BRCA2 gene or the sequence of its mRNA
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unpatentable scientific knowledge, should be considered to be in the
prior art, and that claims to cDNA lack “some other inventive step”
because the process for isolating DNA and removing its introns is so
well known in the prior art. Alternatively, an alleged infringer could
argue that claim 6 of Myriad’s ‘282 patent is overly broad and thus
anticipated by any previously discovered gene which contains a string
of 15 nucleotides (15mer) also found in BRCA 1. Even though the
written description describes BRCA 1 as having “no significant
homology with known protein or DNA sequences,” it does not go so
far as to suggest that absolutely no homology exists. In fact, it is likely
that several of BRCA 1’s 15mers can be found in a previously
discovered gene. 173 As an example, claim 1 of U.S. Patent 5,622,829
claims the isolated cDNA of various BRCA 1 alleles, all of which
contain far more than 15 nucleotides in common with claim 6 of
Myriad’s ‘282 patent.
An alleged infringer could also challenge the validity of claim 6 of
the ‘282 patent as broader than the written description. While the
written description only describes the BRCA 1 gene, claim 6—vis-à-vis
its reference to SEQ ID NO: 1—covers 15mers known to exist in
nearly every human chromosome. 174 This means that claim 6
technically covers the DNA sequences of all other genes that contain
a 15mer found in SEQ ID NO: 1. In fact, this problem of overly
broad claims is likely to be found in all cDNA patents: As
documented by Rosenfeld and Mason, “an analysis of all current US
patent claims and the human genome presented here shows that
15mer sequences from all human genes match at least one other
gene.” 175 If successful in invalidating cDNA claims, these strategies
could also be used to challenge process claims which merely apply
natural laws by adding mental steps such as analyzing and comparing
results, such as claim 2 of Myriad’s ‘857 patent.176 Linking challenges
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of the subject indicates a predisposition to said cancer.” U.S. Pat. 6,033,857 (filed
Mar. 20, 1998).
177. Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy to Dr. Francis S. Collins, Director, Nat’l
Inst. of Health (July 12, 2013), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/
download/07-12-13-pjl-to-nih-re_-myriad-march-in.
178. 35 U.S.C. 203(a)(2), Pub. L. 107-273 (2002).
179. Kevin E. Noonan, Groups Petition for NIH Exercise of March-in Rights Over
Abbott Laboratories’ Norvir, PATENT DOCS – BIOTECH & PHARMA PATENT LAW & NEWS
BLOG (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/11/groups-petition-for-nihexercise-of-march-in-rights-over-abbott-laboratories-norvir.html.
180. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 27, 125 Stat. 338
(2011).
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of cDNA claims to method claims in this way could serve to calibrate
patentability standards in order to minimize overlapping scopes of
preemption between related biotech claims.
In the alternative, there are non-litigation means for promoting the
spirit of the natural phenomenon doctrine. For example, a recent
petition by Senator Patrick Leahy to the NIH calls for march-in rights
with respect to Myriad’s remaining patents on BRCA 1/2 diagnostic
tests. 177 March-in rights, as authorized under 35 U.S.C. § 203, allow
federal agencies like the NIH to issue the equivalent of a compulsory
license when “action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs
which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their
licensees.” 178 While the NIH has previously rejected march-in
petitions concerning life-saving medicines being sold at unaffordable
prices, 179 the case of diagnostic biotech patents may be more
compelling because cost is not the primary concern.
More
problematically from a medical standpoint, exclusively licensed DNA
patents prevent patient access to confirming (second-opinion)
diagnostic tests—a problem which the USPTO was directed to
explore with the passage of the America Invents Act. 180 If the primary
concern of the natural phenomenon doctrine is unwarranted
preemption of scientific tools, a liberal application of it in upholding
diagnostic biotechnology patents—whether they be considered
processes or products—may be compatible with the exercise of
march-in rights. By exercising march-in rights, the government could
obtain the ability to sub-license cDNA patents (while reimbursing
patentees through reasonable royalties) to avoid wholesale
preemption of genetic sequence testing. In doing so, it would
promote the spirit of the law in avoiding absolute preemption of
natural phenomena, while at the same time leveraging government
funds to incentivize useful applications of natural phenomena.
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181. JEFFREY M. KUHN, Patentable Subject Matter Matters: New Uses For An Old
Doctrine, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J 89,112 (2007).
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The history of the entanglement of biomedical process patents with
biomedical product patents provides some valuable lessons for future
assessments of associated product and process claims in biotech
patent applications. For instance, when the scope of preemption
appears to exceed the scope of invention for biotech claims
resembling natural phenomena, “[f]orcing patents with abstract
claims into a lower grade of patent might deter many of the current
costs associated with abstract patent claims.” 181 Yet herein emerges a
procedural limitation in applying an arguably antiquated doctrine to
a separately conceived litigation process: at the litigation stage, it is
not possible for courts to reinterpret or revise the form or scope of
gene patents.
If the natural phenomenon doctrine was meant to exclude certain
categories of discoveries from patentability before Congress had the
opportunity to refine more specific patent validity rules, then perhaps
it is more effective at carrying out that function at the outset of patent
prosecution. The natural phenomenon doctrine, as many examples
in this article have shown, serves the important purpose of ensuring
that patents do not contravene their Constitutional objective by too
broadly preempting the use of basic scientific knowledge and tools.
It does so by balancing the scope of preemption against the scope of
invention (defined as the extent to which the claimed product is
“markedly different” from what is found in nature), and ensuring
that the scope of preemption does not exceed that which is justified
by the inventor’s handiwork in applying, isolating or manipulating
natural phenomena. At the patent prosecution stage, the natural
phenomenon doctrine may thus be a useful catch-all analytical tool
that allows flexibility in promoting the spirit of patent law as it
attempts to keep pace with the progress of science. Yet at the
litigation stage, the doctrine perhaps proves too much: In the
absence of a procedural mechanism to alter a patent at this stage, the
natural phenomenon doctrine cannot be applied with sufficient
nuance to limit the scope of preemption to the scope of invention.
While the doctrine may be useful—and perhaps even ought to be
more liberally construed—at the patent prosecution stage, it was not
originally designed to be compatible with today’s patent litigation
procedures as other statutory patentability requirements were.
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As a doctrine of limitation, it must, at the litigation stage, either
prove nothing at the expense of unwarranted preemption or prove
too much at the expense of patent holders who have been reasonably
relying on guidance from the USPTO for many years. At its
inception, the natural phenomenon doctrine was simply not
designed to fit within the bounds of contemporary patent litigation.
So even though it may seem ideally fit for settling some of the more
difficult questions raised by diagnostic biotech patents, it may be illsuited for regular deployment within the narrow space of today’s
patent litigation process.
Fortunately, in light of Myriad, the USPTO is expected to revisit its
2012 Interim Procedure for Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis of
Process Claims Involving Laws of Nature182 to develop more
permanent guidelines. At minimum, these should account for the
fact that patents on biotech products are likely to preempt the use of
naturally occurring biotech processes. For instance, functional
claiming could be explicitly limited to those sequences which cannot
be found in nature. Guidelines to this effect could be especially
useful as biotech patentees consider submitting reissue applications
on patents that include claims to isolated gDNA, using narrower
claims that explicitly exclude areas of overlap with naturally
occurring phenomena.
CONCLUSION
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182. Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfield, Deputy Comm’r for Patent
Examination Policy, USPTO, to Patent Examining Corps, USPTO (July 3, 2012),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/ 2012_interim_guidance.pdf
(“While Mayo has provided additional details for the eligibility analysis that the
Office developed after Bilski, the technology areas currently being addressed by the
Federal Circuit, most notably in Myriad and Ultramercial, will provide insight
regarding the full reach of Bilski and Mayo. The Office believes that the prudent
course of action is to wait for resolution of these cases before issuing comprehensive
updated guidance.”).
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As statutory and judicial standards for biomedical process patents
have evolved, they have responded both to changes in technology
and public policy concerns. Biomedical process patents have
historically been viewed with skepticism because they allow
monopolies on applications of medically relevant scientific truths and
natural phenomena. When the Physician’s Immunity Statute was
passed in 1997, it only addressed the patentability implications of a
narrow range of biomedical process patents, leaving similar issues
related to biotechnology patentability unresolved. At the same time,
another set of statutes sought to protect process patents for the
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183. SHAMNAD BASHEER ET AL., WIPO STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS,
PATENT EXCLUSIONS THAT PROMOTE PUBLIC HEALTH OBJECTIVES, WIPO SCP/15/3
Annex IV (2010).

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 41 Side A

growing biotech industry, although they did little to address the
increasingly complex doctrinal questions for the dual nature of
biotech patents. The uncertain legal status of associated process and
product claims thus inevitably led to questions about the preemptive
scope of these proliferating patents. The Federal Circuit’s creation of
new analytical tests strove to keep pace with innovation in new kinds
of information- and technology-related processes, but the application
of these tests to diagnostic biotechnology in particular proved to be
short-lived. Uniquely, diagnostic process patents raise fundamental
doctrinal questions about what subject matter is eligible for patent
protection in light of the tenuous legal relationships between
naturally occurring biological processes, their manipulated
counterparts and the natural information flows they effectively
monopolize. In this milieu, an analytical framework was needed that
could properly account for the interconnected nature of
compositions of matter and processes in biotechnology. When
Myriad reached the Supreme Court, the time was in a way ripe for
application of the natural phenomenon doctrine, which retains the
flexibility necessary to adapt to quickly changing modes of
innovation. Indeed, a 2010 World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) study found that in many of its member states, it was not
until relatively recently that “methods of medical treatment began to
be seen more as a patent eligibility criterion stemming from public
policy concerns.” 183
As this article has shown, U.S. case law involving the natural
phenomenon doctrine regularly interchanged precedent concerning
product and process claims Moreover, the natural phenomenon
doctrine’s focus on the preemption-invention ratio renders it
particularly suitable for application to diagnostic biotechnology due
to the special problems that arise out of the process-product
entanglement with biological information flows.
The natural
phenomenon doctrine warrants limiting the scope of a diagnostic
biotech product claim on the basis of its inventive scope (the extent
to which the invention is “markedly different” from nature) being
commensurate with its preemptive scope. However, because a
nuanced application of the natural phenomenon doctrine yields a
result which is only ideally instructive at the patent prosecution stage,
at the litigation stage, it can serve only to either substantially protect
incentives for innovation in the biotechnology industry or to address
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Objects in Biotechnology and Software: A Tale of Changes of Ontological
Assumptions in Intellectual Property Protection, 40 ECON. & SOC’Y 611, 633 (2011).
186. Kristin Connarn, supra note 49, at 300.
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184. John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
569, 610 (2002).
185. See, e.g., Andrea Bonacccorsi et al., From Protecting Texts to Protecting
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the concerns about preemption of laws of nature; but it cannot
properly balance the two. Its role at the prosecution stage must
therefore be taken very seriously.
As processes become increasingly dependent on biology, “the
impact of traditionally patentable subject matter upon the exercise of
individual liberties grows,” 184 and the imperative for nuanced scrutiny
heightens. After Myriad, claims to cDNA can still effectively
monopolize the nature embodied in gDNA sequences. Myriad ‘s
partial invalidity ruling—which has paved the way for more
challenges to Myriad’s patents as defenses to infringement suits—
forces us to reconsider the relationship between biotech processes
and compositions of matter that effectively monopolize the same
subject matter. Future developments in patent law concerning
subject-matter eligibility for diagnostic biotech patents, such as
revisions to patent prosecution guidelines, should explicitly account
for the narrowing theoretical distinctions between processes and
products in this field. Certainly, biotechnology is not unique in this
respect; many commentators have described how similar issues are
raised by software and computer technologies. 185 Indeed, the
shortsighted solution offered by the Biotechnology Process Patent Act
has been compared to the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act,
another “statute that was tied specifically to a technology that quickly
became outdated.” 186 From a birds-eye view, the complexities that
arise out of trying to apply traditional patent frameworks to new
boundary-defying technologies shed light on the shortcomings of a
uniform patent system in adequately calibrating the progress of
science within any given field.

